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On the Temporal Dimension or Counterfactuality
Michela Ippolito
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

1.

CondItional Statements

In the past thirty years philosophers and linguists have believed that conditional
statements come in two varieties, indicative and subjunctive conditionals. These two
kinds of conditionals are morphologically distinct: the latter shows subjunctive
morphology, whereas the fonner shows indicative morphology. The pair in (1)-(2)
illustrates this difference. Notice that, because of the lack of subjunctive morphology,
English subjunctive counterfactuals show past morphology instead (arrived): as shown
by its co-occurrence with the temporal adverb tomorrow, the past is not interpreted
temporally.
(1)

(2)

Indicative conditiolUJI
If Charlie arrives tomorrow, he will meet Lucy.
Subjunctive conditional

If Charlie arrived tomorrow, he would meet Lucy.
They believed that this partition was sufficient to account for the differences in the
felicity conditions of conditional statements. Thus, two pragmatic constraints were
proposed to capture the meaning difference between (1) and (2). What is the difference
between (I) and (2)? Intuitively, when the subjunctive conditional in (2) is uttered instead
of the indicative conditional in (I), the information is conveyed that the speaker believes
that the hypothetical event expressed by the antecedent clause, e.g. the event of Charlie
arriving tomorrow, is unlikely to happen or is not going to happen. On the other hand, in
uttering the indicative conditional in (1), the speaker is neutral as to whether Charlie will
or will not arrive tomorrow. Stalnaker (1975) addressed this point and explicitly
connected this meaning difference to the morphological difference between the two types
of conditionals. He suggested that the subjunctive mood in English and other languages is
a conventional device to indicate that the selection function is one that may reach outside
the context set. The absence of the subjunctive mood, on the other hand, indicates that the
02002 by Michela Ippolito
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selection function reaches inside the context set. In order to understand this claim, let me
sketch Stalnaker' 5 theory of conditionals.
A context is the common knowledge, or presumed common knowledge, of the
participants in the conversation. Following Stalnaker's tenninology, let us call this
(presumed) common knowledge the presuppositions of the speaker. This presupPOsed
information can also be represented as a set of possible worlds, Le. those possible worlds
where all that is presupposed is true. Call this set of possible worlds the context set. A
conditional statement if A, then B is an assertion that the consequent is true in the world
as it would be if the antecedent were true. The selection junction f is precisely the
function that takes the actual world w and the proposition p expressed by the antecedent
into a possible world, i.e. the world as it would be if the antecedent were true. Thus, the
conditional if A. then B is true in a possible world w just in case B is true in ftA. w). In
addition, a pragmatic constraint holds: if the world of evaluation is within the context set,
then the worlds selected by the selection function must be within the context set too (that
is, where C is the context set. if WE C, then ftA. w) E C). Intuitively, everything that is
presupposed to hold in the actual world is presupposed to hold in the hypothetical world
in which the antecedent is true. The contribution of the subjunctive mood signals that the
selection function is reaching outside the context set. Le. is possibly selecting a world
where some of the presuppositions that hold in the actual world have been suspended. In
other words, the subjunctive mood indicates that counterfactual worlds are in the domain
of the function.
In this paper, I argue that the distinction between indicative and subjunctive
counterfactuals is necessary but not sufficient to account for the felicity conditions of all
conditional statements. A further partition is required and I claim that this partition has to
be drawn along the temporal dimension of conditionals. I discuss some problematic
counterfactual statements, and I develop a formal proposal in order to account for their
meaning. Furthermore, I argue that the proposal introduced in this paper is independently
needed to account for other properties of counterfactuals. which are unaccounted for by
the traditional view.
The pair (1) and (2) points to the indicative versus subjunctive distinction within
the domain of conditionals. In tum, the domain of subjunctive conditionals is divided into
two subgroups: non-past subjunctive conditionals and past subjunctive conditionals. The
sentence in (2) - repeated in (3) - exemplifies the former kind; the sentence in (3)
exemplifies the latter.
(3)

If Charlie arrived tomorrow, he would meet Lucy.

(4)

If Charlie had arrived yesterday, he would have met Lucy.

Going back to our original remarks, it is often suggested in informal treatments of
subjunctive conditionals that the past tense in the antecedent of (5) is not a real past, but a
'modal-past' (palmer 1986,2001). Thus, the label "subjunctive" conditional.
(5)

If Mary came, John would stay.

[Palmer 2001, 14)
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The intuition hehind the lahel 'modal-past' is that the past tense in the antecedent does
not locate the event in the past, but removes the speaker from the actual situation and
places him into an unreal one. Now consider (6), where the past tense is marked twice.
(6)

If John had come, Bill might have left.

[Palmer 2001, 208J

Here the suggestion is that the past is marked once for unreality, once for past time, since

"have functions in English as both a marker of perfect aspect and of past time" (Palmer
2001,208).
latridou (2000) exploits this intuition as well. She argues that mood is not a
necessary ingredient of Counterfactuality, and that language-specific rules may he
responsible for its occurrence. In her proposal, the past tense morphology instantiates
what she calls the exclusion feature. This feature can either be interpreted in the domain
of time or in the domain of worlds. In the former case, a sentence with past will he
interpreted as talking about a time different from the time of the utterance; in the latter
case, a sentence with past will he interpreted as talking about worlds different from the
actual world. In a simple sentence such as John left past is interpreted temporally and the
sentence talks about a past time at which an event of John's leaving took place. The
possibility of interpreting past modally (i.e. as excluding the actual world) is exploited in
conditionals like (5) or (6). The difference between (5) and (6) is that, in the latter, two
layers of past occur, the one occurring on the auxiliary have and the one instantiated by
the past -ed. Iatridou's proposal is fundamentally similar to Palmer's: one layer of past is
interpreted modally, thus contributing to the modal interpretation of the structure; the
other layer of past is interpreted temporally, i.e. as expressing a relation of anteriority
between the hypothetical event and tbe utterance time.
Notice that this has an important consequence. The layer of past that is interpreted
temporally locates the hypothetical event in time and, as such, is required to be
interpreted inside the proposition expressed by the antecedent. This is exactly parallel to
what happens in a simple sentence with the past tense: in (7), the past tense locates the
event of playing in the past, reason why it is compatible with the past adverb yesterday
but not with tomorrow.
(7)

Charlie played with Lucy (yesterday/#tomorrow).

Informally, the conditional in (6) is true iff the consequent is true in all the accessible
possible worlds where the proposition that John came is true.

2.

Mismatched Past Counterfactuals

Past counterfactuals do not always talk about the past. Sometimes they talk about the
future despite their overt past morphology. Imagine the following scenario. Charlie got
married yesterday. Unfortunately, after the ceremony a violent thunderstorm broke out
and they had to call off the outdoor reception. I have just heard the forecast on TV: the
rain will finally cease tonight. In these circumstances, (8) is felicitous but (9) isn't. Call
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conditionals like (8) mismatched past subjunctive countetjactuals (MPSC) and
conditionals like (9) non-past subjunctive conditionals (NPSC).I
(8)

If Charlie had gotten married tomorrow, they could have had the outdoor
reception.

(9)

#If Charlie got married tomorrow, they could have the outdoor reception.

The pair in (8)-(9) is puzzling for two reasons. (i) The subjunctive conditional in (8)
describes a future hypothetical eventuality despite the past morphology. (ii) The non-past
SUbjunctive conditional in (9) cannot be used to talk about a future hypothetical event.
Now consider a modification of the above scenario. Charlie had planned to get married
yesterday but, having heard about the furious storm that was approaching, decided to
postpone the ceremony to a better day. Having just heard the forecast on TV, I can utter
(9) but not (8). The situation is now reversed. The conclusion is that for a MPSC to be
felicitous, the event described in the antecedent must be impossible (false).
The proposal above is unable to account for the mismatched past counterfactuals.
The reason is that the analysis requires one layer of past to be interpreted inside the
antecedent, but because of the future adverb tomorrow, the result is nonsensical. Thus,
we have made a step forward: at least in the case of mismatched past counterfactuals, we
know that the past tense cannot be interpreted inside the antecedent. These cases are
beyond the reach of the theories I sketched above.
In what follows I will present my proposal for MPSCs and for why their felicity
conditions differ from those of the NPSCs. Then, I will present new data and show that
the standard theory of counterfactuals cannot account for them and I will argue that the
semantic theory I develop can and, consequently, is to be preferred.

2.

The Interpretation of the Past

The discussion of the MPSCs above uncovered the two crucial properties of these
conditionals. The first property has to do with their felicity condition: a MPSC is
felicitous only if the proposition expressed by the antecedent is understood to be
impossible. The second property is what we may for the time being call a
"morphological" property: the occurrence of two layers of past, none of which locating
the hypothetical event purported by the antecedent in the past. The objective of the
present investigation is to develop a semantic theory where these properties follow
without stipulations.

2.1

Past and AccessiblHty Relations

Following Ippolito (200 la), I suggest that the connection between the two layers of past
and the impossibility of the antecedent is that the extra past tense in a MPCS is the source
of the impossibility.

1 Similar examples are discussed for example in Dudman (1983). (1984) and Ogihara (2000). The
latter. in particular. offers an interesting discussion and a fonnal propnsal. In Ippnlito (2001). I have
discussed his propnsal in great detail and showed that. despite its many insights. it cannot be maintained.
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I shall assume the possible world semantics and the theory of conditionals
developed in Kratzer (1981), (1986) and (1991).2 In the same vein as Lewis (1975),s
treatment of adverbs of quantification, Kratzer does not analyze the connective if as a
two-place operator taking the antecedent and the consequent as its arguments. Instead, a
conditional sentence is analyzed as a tripartite structure: the if-clause is interpreted in the
restriction of a possibly covert modal operator, whereas the consequent is interpreted in
the nuclear scope. Thus, the structure determined by a modal operator is similar to any
other quantificational structure.
Quantification over worlds is restricted by an accessibility relation: only those
possible worlds "relevantly" accessible from the actual world will be selected to be in the
domain of the modal operator. What counts as the "relevantly accessible" depends on the
lexical meaning of the modal involved. For example, epistemic modaIs such as must in
Charlie must be at home by now involve epistemic accessibility relation: only the
possible worlds compatible with what the speaker knows in the actual world will be
selected. The accessibility relation for deontic modals such as must in Children must be
accompanied by a parent selects only those possible worlds where what is a law in the
actual world is true. Thus, accessibility relations must be binary relations between
worlds.
But this is not enough. In fact, knowledge, beliefs, plans, desires and other human
attitudes change over time. Also the relevant facts about the world change over time.
Therefore, the set of worlds over which modal operators quantify will depend not only on
what the actual world is but also on what the time of evaluation is. What 1 know, believe,
plan or desire may be different from what 1 knew, believed, planned, desired in the past.
Also, the world now may be different from what it used to be. Therefore, what was
compatible with knowledge or beliefs or plans, or the world then may be incompatible
with it now.
This is why accessibility relations cannot simply be binary relations between
worlds. Accessibility relations must at least be binary relations between a world-time pair
and a world. Their type must be <S,<i,<S,t»>, where ie 1 (I the domain of times), and
not the simple <s,<s,t». The possible worlds over which tbe modal operator quantifies
will not only be relative to the world of evaluation but also to the time of evaluation. As
in the case of worlds, the time of evaluation will by default be the time of the speaker (the
time of the utterance), unless specified otherwise. The structure will look like the one in
(10), where WI is the world of evaluation and t2 is the time of evaluation. By default, WI
and t2 will be assigned the actual world and the utterance time respectively.

=

2 A quantificational theory of modality was developed in earnap (1941), Hintikka (1961) and
Kripke (1959) and (1963), among others. A theory of possible WOt'lds in relalion to counterfactuals was
developed by Lewis (1986) and (1913).
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(10)

I

~
'1

li<51>

<51,1>

~

Ii

Modal
<<S,t>,<st.,t»

<S,t>

~
<i,G.t»

~
R
<I,<:I,<5,t»>

W,

I will assume that the only true tense is the past because the future is semantically
a modal and the present is the interpretation of a T node when it is marked as non-past
(the default interpretation). Also, I will assume the presuppositional variant of the
referential analysis of tense developed by Partee (1973), En~ (1987) and Kratzer (1998).
Heim (1994) suggests that the tense feature [past] is interpreted as a presupposition: the
sentence will only be defined if there is a relevant past time in the context. The lexical
entry is given in (11).
(11)

[[PASTI]]"C defined only if g(l)<t.,; if defined, then [[PASTIl]"c= g(l)

Let us go back to the structure in (10) and concentrate on t2. As I said above, tz
will get the utterance time as the default value, unless t2 is forced to get a different value.
I suggest that this is what happens when the past tense is interpreted on tz.
(12)

t

~
'1

li<sl>

<5t.1>

~

Ii

Modal
<<5,1>,<51,1»

<5,1>

~
a
t,(past]
<i.<S,t»

~
R
W,
<s.<i.<s,t»>

To sum up, accessibility relations have to be relations between a world and a world-time
pair. The time argument gets the utterance time as the default value, unless the past tense
is interpreted outside the proposition where it occurs, i.e. within R. We are now in a
position to start building the solution to the puzzle of MPCSs.
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The Solution to the Temporal Mismatch

I analyze a conditional sentence as a quantificational structure II la Kratzer, where the
antecedent is interpreted in the restriction of the modal operator, and the consequent in
the nuclear scope. Given that the modal operator will always he restricted by an
accessibility relation R, the antecedent will actually have to compose with R. The
structure will be like the one in (13): cr is the antecedent, the consequent.

a

(13)

St

~
y

5<51>

<st,1>

~
Modal
<<5,I>,<5t.1»

E <5,1>
~

II
<5,t>

a
<s.t>

~
a
I,[past]
<i.<S,t»

~

R
<s.<i,<s,I»>

WI

Node e is the conjunction of IJ and cr and will be composed by some version of the
Predicate Modification (cf. Heim and Kratzer 1998). The truth-conditions for (8) repeated in (14) - are given in (15). The nature of the modality is left unspecified: in (15)
the set of worlds w over which we quantify is the set of those worlds compatible with
some relevant aspect Qf the actual world.3 Moreover, as a consequence of the fact that the
are interpreted as tenseless
tense is interpreted inside IJ. both propositions cr and
propositions.

a

(14)

If Charlie had gotten married tomorrow. they could have had the outdoor
reception.

(15)

[[S}]g.c 1 iff 'v'weW[ w is accessible from g(1) at g(2) and Charlie gets married
tomorrow in w ~ they have the outdoor reception in w1defined only if g(2 )<tc

=

=

The assignment function g will assign the actual world to the index 1 (Le. g(l) we).
Informally. (14) is true if and only if for all the worlds w compatible with the actual
world at some (contextually salient) past time and such that Charlie gets married
tomorrow in w. they have the outdoor reception in w. This is all the semantics gives you.
We naturally achieve an important result: the mismatched past subjunctive
counterfactual in (14) is like the non-past subjunctive conditional in (9) - repeated in (16)
- but without the contribution of the past tense:
3 In what follows I may sometime use the shorter "compatible with the actual world" instead of the
correct but longer "compatible wilh some relevant aspect of Ihe worUf'. Whenever I do that, I mean the
laUer.
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If Charlie got married tomorrow. they could have the outdoor reception.

The truth-conditions for (16) are like those for (14). except for the lack of [past]
constraining the time variable t2. The set of worlds quantified over is the set of worlds
compatible with the actual world at the time of the utterance (the default time). As above.
g(l) = We.
(17)

[[S)),·e = 1 iff "Vwe W[ w is accessible from g( I) at g(2) and Charlie gets married
tomorrow in w ~ they have the outdoor reception in w) g(2J=tc.

We have explained the role of the second layer of past and the apparent mismatch
between the tense and the future adverb in the antecedent. But. if the truth-conditions in
(15) are all the semantics gives us. we stilI have not explained the felicity condition on
the antecedent. i.e. that it be impossible. This is the goal of the next two sections.

3.

Presuppositions

The purpose of this section is to show that the contrast between the felicity conditions of
NPSC and MPSC in (14) and (16) is not isolated and that in order to explain it. we must
have a general theory about the presuppositions of NPSCs and MPSCs.
I shall adopt Stalnaker (1975),s notion of Context Set. defined as in (18).4
(18)

Context Set C = {weW: wep for all p in the Common Ground}

(19)

Common Ground = {{J!;;W: p is presupposed by the participants to the
conversation}

I shall make the notion of context set and common ground time-sensitive. as follows. Let
C. be the context set at the utterance time. that is to say the set of all possible worlds w
such that all the propositions true in the common ground at t. (the utterance time) are true
inw.
(20)

a. Context Set C. = { weW: wep for all p in the Common Ground at Iu}
b. CGg = {p~W: p is presupposed by the participants to the conversation at Iu}
c. Context Set Cn
we W: we p for all p in the Common Ground at tn }
d. CGn = {Jl!;W: p is presupposed by the participants to the conversation at Inl

={

Now consider the non-past subjunctive conditional in (21).
(21)

#Charlie is dead. If he came to the party tomorrow. he would meet Sally.

• In Stalnaker's words .. The most imponant element of • context, I suggest, is the common
knowledge, or presumed common knowledge and common assumptions of the panicipants in the
discourse" (Stalnaker 1975. p. 67). A little later he explicitly says that the (presumed) common ground are
the presuppositions of Ihe speaktr: they are common to the spealrer and his andience in so far as he
assumes they are. Thus, in defining the Common Ground. I will only malee reference to the participants in
the conversation. with the understanding that the presuppositions are the presupposilions of Ihe speaur.
which are projected onto his audience as well.
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Charlie cannot come to the party because he is dead. Intuitively, the deviance of (21) is
due to the fact that coming to the party tomorrow presupposes being alive and this is
inconsistent with Charlie being dead. In different terms: the deviance of this sentence is
due to the fact that the presuppositions of the antecedent will have to hold in that context,
thus causing the context to be inconsistent. Therefore, there must be a condition on the
felicity of a non-past subjunctive conditional: the presuppositions of the antecedent must
not be inconsistent with the context of the'utterance. More formally, let P be the set of all
worlds w such that the conjunction of all the presuppositions of the antecedent p of the
conditional is true in w. (22) says that a non-past subjunctive conditional presupposes that
the intersection of P and C. is not empty. In other words, there must be worlds in the
context set where the conjunction of all the presuppositions of p is true, i.e. what the
antecedent presupposes must be consistent with what is known (assumed) at the utterance
time.

(22)

Felicity Condition/or NPSCs
PnC.¢0

Recall the truth-conditions for a non-past subjunctive conditional, for example (16),
repeated below in (23).
(23)

[[Sn l -O = I iff 'v'weW[ w is accessible from g(1) at g(2) and Charlie gets married
tomorrow in w - t they have the outdoor reception in w] g(2)=tc•

Notice that the time of the evaluation in the truth-conditions corresponds to the time of C
in the felicity condition. I'll make the hypothesis that in general the time relevant for the
felicity condition is identical to the time of the evaluation.

(24)

Hypothesis
The time relevant for the felicity conditions of a subjunctive conditional is
identical to the value of the time argument of the accessibility relation.

Thus, in a mismatched past subjunctive counterfactual too the time of C will depend on
the time of evaluation, which in this case is a (contextually salient) past time. If the
hypothesis is correct, the felicity condition for a mismatched past subjunctive
counterfactual will he as in (25). In (26) I repeat the truth-conditions for a mismatched
past counterfactual.

(25)

-Felicity Condition/or MPSCs
PnC'2<u¢0

(26)

[[S])"o = 1 iff 'v'weW[ w is accessible from g(l) at g(2) and Charlie gets married
tomorrow in w -+ they have the outdoor reception in wJ defined only if g(2)<tc

C 2<u is the context set built on CG2<u.
(27)

a. Context Set C 2<u = { weW: wep for all p in the Common Ground at t2<ol
b. CG2<u {~W: p is presupposed by the participants to the conversation at t2<u}

=
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The felicity condition in (25) says that a mismatched past counterfactual presupposes that
the intersection between the set of worlds w such that the conjunction of the
presuppositions of the antecedent is true in w and the set of worlds w' such that all that is
presupposed at some (contextually salient) past time t2 is true in w' is not empty. In other
words, the presuppositions of the antecedent must be consistent with what was known
(assumed) at some past time.
We predict that the propositions in C. (the propositions true in CGu) should be
irrelevant to the felicity of a mismatched past counterfactual. I have found that this is
indeed correct, at least with respect to some presuppositions. Suppose Charlie died last
week. Coming to the party tomorrow presupposes being alive tomorrow and this is
inconsistent with Charlie being dead at the utterance time. Nevertheless, the mismatched
past counterfactual in (28a) is acceptable. Notice the contrast with (21) above.
(28)

a Charlie is dead. If he had come to the party tomorrow, he would have met
Sally.
b. Charlie is dead. If he had come to the party yesterday, he would have met Sally.

The behavior of non-past and mismatched past subjunctive conditionals is consistent
across a number of different presuppositions. Let us consider the presupposition of to
sell, to quit and the existence presupposition of definites.
The verb to sell presupposes that the object that is sold is owned by the seller
immediately before the selling takes place. In other words, to sell something presupposes
to own it at the time of the selling. Negation tests for presupposition in (29).
(29)

a Charlie sold the DucatL
PRESUPPOsmON: Charlie owned the Ducati
b. Charlie didn't sell the Ducati.
PRESUPPOsmON: Charlie owned the Ducati.

Being a presupposition trigger, the verb. to own can be used to test my hypothesis that
whereas in non-past subjunctive conditionals the presuppositions of the antecedent have
to be consistent with what the speaker knows at the utterance time, in mismatched past
counterfactuals the presuppositions of the antecedent have to be consistent with what the
speaker knew at some past time.
The following examples support the hypothesis.
(30)
(a)
(b)

(c)

Charlie used to own a lot of stocks but ten years ago, after a crisis of the stock
market, he sold everything and since then he's never had any stocks.
#Too bad. If Charlie sold his stocks tomorrow, he would make a lot of money.
Too bad. If Charlie had sold his stocks tomorrow, he would have made a lot of
money.
Too bad. If Charlie had sold his stocks yesterday, he would have made a lot of
money.

In t~e example (a), the presupposition required by the counterfactual event is that Charlie
owns the stocks until tomorrow, which is inconsistent with the presupposition in the
utterance context. No accommodation is possible and the sentence is deviant.
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Interestingly, the acceptability of the mismatched past counterfactual in (b) tells us that in
the world in which the antecedent is true, the proposition that Charlie owns the stocks
until tomorrow is true too, despite its inconsistency with the presupposition in the
utterance context that Charlie hasn't owned stocks for the past ten years. Notice that the
same is true for the past counterfactual in (c), which fo1\ows the pattern of the
mismatched past counterfactual in (b).
According to the hypothesis I am arguing for, the felicity condition for (3Ob) is
(25): PnC'l<III iI0. The intersection between the set of worlds w such that the conjunction
of all the presuppositions of the antecedent is true in w and the set of worlds where the
conjunction of all the presuppositions in the common ground at some past time is true,
must not be empty. In other words, the felicity condition for a mismatched past
counterfactual is that the presuppositions of the antecedent not be inconsistent with some
past epistemic state. Of course, this allows for the possibility that they could be
inconsistent with the current epistemic state, which is a welcome result, given the
acceptability of (28a) and (30b).
Incidentally, notice that the non-mismatched past counterfactual in (30e) is not
deviant either. The fact that non-mismatched past counterfactuals seem to pattern like
mismatched past counterfactuals with respect to presuppositions' cance1\ation and
accommodation but differently from non-past conditionals, suggests that in nonmismatched past counterfactuals too the (extra) past tense may actually restrict the
accessibility relation, thus forcing the evaluation time to be past to the utterance time. I
leave the investigation of this issue to the future.
More. To quit an activity x requires that x goes on at the time of the quitting.
Thus. we say that to quit smoking presupposes to smoke immediately before the quitting
time. Negation. again, tests for the presupposition.
(31)

a. Lucy quit smoking.
PRESUPPOsmON: Lucy smoked
b. Lucy didn't quit smoking.
PRESUPPOsmON: Lucy smoked

Again. the counterfactuals behave exactly as predicted by our hypothesis.
(32)

(a)
(b)

(c)

Lucy was a heavy smoker but she quit smoking ten years ago. after she had
pneumonia. A new law was passed last week that says that if you quit smoking
from now on. you have to undergo a new medical test which is quite painful even
if very useful in detecting problems for the lungs of the ex-smoker. Thinking
about Lucy, I say:
#Good for her! If she quit smoking tomorrow. she would have to take the new
painful test.
Good for her! If she had quit smoking tomorrow, she would have had to take the
new painful test.
Good for her! If she had quit smoking yesterday, she would have had to take the
new painful test.

Again. the presupposition that Lucy's smoking stretches up to yesterday is not
accommodated in (a), but it is accommodated in (b). the only difference between the two
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being the extra layer of past in tbe antecedent (and in tbe consequent). As before. the
presupposition is also accommodated in (c). which thus patterns like (b) and not like (a).
Lastly. let me consider tbe case of an existence presupposition. In (33a) tbe
presupposition required by the antecedent - that there is a guitar and that Lucy owns it
until tomorrow - is not accommodated; in (33b). it is.
(33)
(a)
(b)
(c)

Lucy's unique guitar burnt in the fire that destroyed her home six months ago.
#Too bad. If Lucy played her guitar tomorrow. she would make a lot of money.
Too bad. If Lucy had played her guitar tomorrow. she would have made a lot of
money.
Too bad. If Lucy had played her guitar yesterday. she would have made a lot of
money.

The conclusion is that tbe restriction that the presuppositions of tbe antecedent must not
be inconsistent with the presuppositions of the utterance (main) context only holds for
non-past subjunctive conditionals. Pluperfect subjunctive conditionals do not obey this
restriction. In other words. a non-past subjunctive conditional cannot presuppose
something that is inconsistent with the main context (the context of the utterance). A
pluperfect subjunctive conditional can: this is so regardless of when tbe counterfactual
eventuality takes place (past or future) and, therefore. regardless of when the relevant
presupposition is required to hold (past or future).s

3.

Scalar Implicatures at tbe PresupposItion Level

The felicity conditions in (22) and (25) talk: about the relation between the
presuppositions of the antecedent of a conditional and tbe episternic state of the speaker
at the time at which the conditional is evaluated. My proposal is that the condition that
tbe antecedent of a MPSC be impossible is a scalar implicature and that it is at the level
of the felicity conditions (presuppositions) that tbe competition occurs.
A scalar implicature results from a competition between two propositions. IX and
~, in a relation of asymmetric entailment (IX-+~). If the speaker chooses to utter Ii (tbe
entailed or 'weaker' proposition). his interlocutors will reason as follows: If tbe speaker
was in the position to utter IX, he would have done so; instead, he said something weaker
(less informative). Thus. it must be tbe case that he was not in the position to utter IX, i.e.
either he did not know that IX or he lmew that ~
In order to explain the falsity of the antecedent in a mismatched past subjunctive
counterfactual as a scalar implicature, there have to be two propositions in an asymmetric
entailment relation. In the next two sections I propose that tbe implicature of falsity
derives from tbe competition between the presuppositions of conditionals. Thus, we have
an extension of tbe Gricean theory: not only can two assertions in relation of asymmetric
entailment compete, but two presuppositions in that relation can compete too. We shall
see how this proposal is in accordance with other research in the domain of
presuppositions.

>The presuppositions facts discussed above and. more generally. the proposal defended here have
important repercussions for the presupposition projection puzzle discussed for example in Heim (1992).
See Ippolito (2001b) for some discussion.
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The felicity conditions given above require that the presuppositions of the
antecedent be compatible with the common ground at some specific time. As Stalnaker
wrote in the quote above, presuppositions can be presumed common knowledge.
Whereas knowledge is always true (factive), presumed knowledge may tum out to be
false. But in the dynainics of a conversation, this distinction turns out to be irrelevant: if
both the speaker and his interlocutors believe that what they assume to be true, is true
(i.e. is knowledge), then the inferences that they will draw are the same as those that they
would draw if what they assume to be true were actually true. Consequently, for the sake
of simplicity, we will be simply talking about knowledge.
Knowledge is factive. When you know that p, you believe that p, you have good
evidence that p and p is true. I cannot discover that what I knew at some past time is no
longer true now, because if I now know that it is not true, then I didn't know it, I merely
believedit. 6
Hence, being a proposition compatible with my knowledge at the utterance time
entails being compatible with my knowledge at any time t earlier than the utterance time.
But not vice versa: being compatible with what I knew at some past time, does not entail
being compatible with what I know now because, for example, I may have learned that
the proposition in question is false. Thus we have what we needed: two propositions in a
relation of asymmetric entailment. Because the notion of presupposition is built on
knowledge, we can conclude that being compatible with the common ground at the
utterance time entails being compatible with the common ground at any time earlier than
the utterance time. Therefore, we obtain the asymmetric entailment in (34).
(34)

PnC u ..0 entails PnCI2<u#0
PnC'2<u #0 does not entail PnC. #0

The asymmetric entailment in (34) draws a distinction between beliefs on one hand and
knowledge and presumed knowledge on the other. It is neither the case that if I believe a
propositionp at some time t', I believe it at any time t"later than t', nor that if I believe p
now, then p must have been consistent with my beliefs at any time t' earlier than now.
Beliefs change over time: I may believe now that what I believed yesterday is false; or I
may now believe true some proposition that yesterday I believed to be false. The same is
true for other kinds of human attitudes (desires, plans and wishes constantly change) and
for the way the world is (states of affairs constantly change). Thus, none of these
modalities makes tbe asymmetric entailment (34) above true. 1
Having construed the desired asymmetric entailments, we can derive the scalar
implicature. This is schematized in (35).

• Knowledge is generally defined in terms of belief; indeed it is • belief that has the property of
being true. That knowledce cannoljust be justified true belief was shown by E. Gettier in his (1963) article
"Is justified true belief knowledge?". Philosophically, important epistemological questions arise with
respect to a satisfactory definition of knowledge. For our purposes, though, the discussion above is
sufficient.
7

See Ippolito (2001b) for a more thorough discussion of these issues.
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(35)
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)

Michela Ippolito
Grlcean competition

You presupposed:
You didn't presuppose:
Thus:

.

PnCU<N;I0
PnC.;10
-, K ( PnCu ;10)
K.., (pnCu ;10)
K(PnCu =0)

Line (c) is the step we are familiar with from classical examples of scalar implicatures:
because the speaker appealed to the less informative presupposition, the interlocutor will
implicate that the speaker does not know that P is incompatible with the common ground
at the utterance time. Because it is assumed that the speaker knows what he presupposes,
step (d) and (e) follow: the speaker knows that P is incompatible with the common
ground at the utterance time. For this to be true, it is sufficient that one of the
presuppositions of the antecedent is false. If (at least) one presupposition of the
antecedent is inconsistent with the context, then the antecedent is not true. 8 As I said in
section 4, the result of a Gricean competition is that the speaker is not in a position to
assert the strong proposition p. This is consistent with two possibilities: that he does not
know that p or that he knows that -,p. In most cases of scalar implicatures, the stronger
result (that he knows that -,p) has to be stipulated. On the contrary, in our competition the
stronger result (Le. line (d» follows naturally. The weaker option is discarded because it
is assumed that the speaker knows what he is presupposing. In other words, if the
presuppositions of the utterance that the speaker made are not compatible with what he in
fact presupposes, then the speaker knows that they are not.9

3.1

Cancelability

I have argued above that the falsity of the antecedent of a mismatched past counterfactual
is an implicature. Implicatures are cancelable. Therefore, the falsity of the antecedent of a
mismatched past counterfactual must be cancelable. I will show that, despite appearances,
it is cancelable.
It seems natural to assume the following pragmatic principle: in engaging in a
conversation with other people, we are interested in what the epistemic state of these
people is at the time at which the conversation takes place. Vice versa, they will be
interested in what our current epistemic state is. My claim above has been that the
implicature of falsity in mismatched past counterfactuals is drawn because the speaker's
presupposition makes reference to his past epistemic state rather than his current
epistemic state, which would have been more informative given the principle above.

• The Context Cbange Potential of a sentence - as defined in Heim (1992) - is a partial function: it
is defi ned only for those contexts that satisfy the presnppnsitions of the sentence in question. This clarifies
what I wrote above: if the presuppositions of the antecedent are not satisfied in C (i.e. if the C does not
entail them), then the antecedent will not be defined.
• The idea of a scalar implicature at the presupposition level rather than at the assertion level is
very similar to an idea that Heim (1991) sugsests in her discussion of indefinites. She argues that in order
to account for the felicity/infelicity of sentences with indefinite articles. the principle "Presuppose as much
as possible" seems to be needed. I refer the reader to her article for a detailed discussion of the issue.
Hawkins (1991) also makes a similar point
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Therefore, the circumstances in which the implicature will be canceled are those
in which it would not have been more relevant for the speaker to inform his interlocutor
about his current epistemic state. In other words, in those circumstances in which it is
enough to inform his audience about his past epistemic states, the implicature won't be
drawn.
I believe this is indeed the case. In the following example, the mismatched past
counterfactuals can be used even though the antecedent of one of them (the one referring
to tomorrow) is actually true.
(36)

Lucy wanted to visit her mother but she was afraid she will fight with her brother
and sister, with whom she does not get along at all. 1 met Charlie this morning and
I asked him whether he knew what Lucy has decided to do. Charlie said:
Yes, she decided to go tomorrow. When I saw her last she was deeply tom: she
had to choose between tomorrow and the day after, because those are her only
days off work. She didn't know what to do: true, if she hod gone to visit her mom
tomorrow, she would have met her brother but, if she hod gone the day after
tomorrow, she would have met both her siblings, which is certainly worse. She
chose tomorrow so as to meet only one of them.

Canceling the implicature of falsity in (36) is possible because the relevant epistemic
state here is not that of the speaker at the utterance time but that of Lucy at the time she
was making the decision. Charlie - the speaker - is reponing Lucy's thinking: the
thoughts she went through in order to decide between tomorrow and the day after.
This is exactly the same mechanism at work in other cases of implicature
cancellation. Normally, if somebody says, "I own two cars", his interlocutors will draw
the implicature that he does not own three (or more) cars. But, now, consider the
following scenario: In order to get a meal plan you must have at least two children.
Suppose B has four children and he's applying for a meal plan. The following exchange
takes place between A - the employee - and B.

(37)

A: Do you have two children?
B: Yes, I do.

Here, the employee will correctly not draw the implicature that B only has two children.
Why? Because the information about the exact number of children B has is not expected
(it's actually irrelevant). Hence, B not giving that piece of information will not have any
significance whatsoever.

4.

Covert Modality

This paper is about how temporal mismatches in conditionals are cases of tense (past)
being interpreted outside the proposition where it occurs in surface structure. The
proposal is that (at least in cases of temporal mismatch) Past is interpreted in the domain
of the modal operator (more precisely, it is interpreted inside the accessibility relation).tO
10 This hypothesis is supported by further data. thorough discussion of which the reader can find in Ippolito
(2001). The relation between modal operators and the complementizer's domain has already been
exploited, for example in Stowell (1982). More specificaBy. in the literature on the syntax of conditionals.
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Notice that in mismatched conditionals this is the only option available, as Past cannot be
interpreted inside the antecedent because of the future temporal adverb.
This can be generalized to all sentences with temporal mismatches. In no sentence
with a temporal mismatch can Past be interpreted inside the proposition where the future
temporal adverb occurs. In other words, in every temporally mismatched sentence Past
must be interpreted in the domain of the modal operator, more specifically, in the
accessibility relation of a modal operator. Consequently, we predict that all sentences
with a temporal mismatch will be interpreted modally. The goal of this section is to show
that this is correct.
Sentence (38) has a special interpretation. It only has a special interpretation.
(38)

Originally, Charlie left tomorrow.

The Past cannot be interpreted inside the proposition; that is to say, it cannot locate the
event of leaving in the past. If it did, the event of Charlie's leaving would be said to occur
both tomorrow and past relative to the utterance time, and the sentence would be as
nonsensical as (39). II
(39)

#Tomorrow, Charlie left.

The former sentence is acceptable, though. What does the past do? In order to answer this
question, we need to ask what (38) intuitively means and in what circumstances it would
be felicitously uttered. Suppose today is Monday aod Charlie had scheduled to leave
tomorrow (Tuesday). I meet Lucy and she tells me that Charlie is coming to dinner on
Wednesday. I am surprised and I tell her that I thought he would have already gone by
then. She can then felicitously utter (38). A similar example is (40).

it has been observed that there exists a kind of subjunctive conditional where (one layer 01) past moves
overtly to C (Pesetsky 1989.latridou and Embick 1994). latridou and a!. also observe that 'inverted
conditionals' have a stronger '~rrealis" flavor when compared with their non·inverted counterpart:
(i)
(ii)

Had Lucy met him for the first time yesterday. she would not have married him.
If Lucy had met him for the first time yesterday. she would not have married him.

The former sentence suggests more strongly that the anlecedent is false and, consequently. would resisl
Anderson's type of examples. Indeed. a future adverb can replace yeslerday in (i): according 10 lhe
speakers I have consUlted, (iii) is the preferred way to talk about a fUluse impossibility.
(iii)

Had Lucy met him for the first lime tomorrow. she would not have married him.

Tuskish offers another case of overt movement of Past to C and. interestingly. this movement is associated
wilh the falsity of the antecedent (see Ippolito (20010) for a discussion of the Tuskish data).
" The same point can he duplicated using the past progressive:
(i)

Charlie was leaving tomorrow.

I have chosen the simple past forms so as to isolate the contribution of tense from the contribution of
aspect. The speakers I have consulted accepted these sentences in the appropriate context. I found similar
examples in Dudman (1983). For analysis of the interaction hetween progressive aspect and modality. see
Dowty (1977) and Copley (2001).
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It is lOam and Charlie has just told Sally that they will play the basketball game
tomorrow. Sally was told last week that they would play tonight. So, she says:
Didn't we play tonight?

Intuitively, (38) talks about what should have been the case if some plans had been
realized. The truth of the proposition expressed by a mismatched sentence such as (68) is
evaluated in all those worlds compatible with some relevant aspect of the actual world:
plans, beliefs, desires, etc. Sentence (38) is a modal sentence, even though its modality is
hidden.
The broader generalization I made above finds support: in every temporally
mismatched sentence, the Past must be interpreted inside the accessibility relation, thus
escaping the nonsensical interpretation. The analysis that I proposed for MPSCs can
naturally be extended to these simpler caseS. 12

5.
Conclusion
One issue open for future investigation is whether non-mismatched past counterfactuals
such as If Charlie had gotten married yesterday, they would have had the outdoor
reception should be given an analysis on the lines of MPSCs. Above, we observed that
they hehave like MPSCs with respect to the presupposition problem. Can the second
layer of past in standard past counterfactual be interpreted as constraining the timeargument of the accessibility relation? Because this interpretation is available to MPSCs,
it will he available to standard past counterfactual as well. Nevertheless, we do not yet
have an argument that standard past counterfactuals must be interpreted this way. A
satisfactory discussion of this issue will have to be postponed, but let me mention that the
contrast between inverted and non-inverted past counterfactuals mentioned in footnote
10, seems to indicate that standard past counterfactuals are in fact ambiguous structures
depending on whether the past tense is interpreted inside the proposition expressed by the
antecedent or outside that proposition.
For lack of space, I have also ignored the question of the formal differences
between counterfactuals (subjunctive conditionals) and indicative conditionals. This will
have to be the subject of a future paper.
I have argued in this paper that the distinction between subjunctive and indicative
conditionals is too course-grained. A further distinction within the class of subjunctive
conditionals has to be drawn along the temporal dimension. Without this distinction, we
are left with no explanation of problematic cases such as MPSCs and, more generally,
with no true understanding of the felicity conditions of conditionals.

12

For the delails, see Ippolilo (2001 b).
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